Language in Language Evolution Research: In Defense of a Pluralistic View by Wacewicz, Slawomir et al.
ARTICLES 
 









Editors: Lluís Barceló-Coblijn, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Spain 
 Evelina Leivada, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain 
 
Received: 10 May 2020   
Accepted: 18 July 2020      CC BY 4.0 License 
Published: 23 March 2021 ISSN 1450–3417   © 2020 The authors 
Language in Language Evolution Research: 
In Defense of a Pluralistic View 
Sławomir Wacewicz1,*,  Przemysław Żywiczyński1,  Stefan 
Hartmann2,  Michael Pleyer3,  &  Antonio Benítez-Burraco4 
1 Center for Language Evolution Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń, Poland 
2 Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Düsseldorf, Germany 
3 Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany 
4 Faculty of Philology, University of Seville, Spain 






Many controversies in language evolution research derive from the fact that 
language is itself a natural language word, which makes the underlying con-
cept fuzzy and cumbersome, and a common perception is that progress in 
language evolution research is hindered because researchers do not ‘talk 
about the same thing’. In this article, we claim that agreement on a single, 
top-down definition of language is not a sine qua non for good and productive 
research in the field of language evolution. First, we use the example of the 
notion FLN (‘faculty of language in the narrow sense’) to demonstrate how 
the specific wording of an important top-down definition of (the faculty of) 
language can—surprisingly—be inconsequential to actual research practice. 
We then review four approaches to language evolution that we estimate to 
be particularly influential in the last decade. We show how their breadth pre-
cludes a single common conceptualization of language but instead leads to a 
family resemblance pattern, which underwrites fruitful communication be-
tween these approaches, leading to cross-fertilisation and synergies. 
Keywords: language; evolution of language; language faculty; language 
readiness 




The emergence of linguistic behaviour undoubtedly counts among the few most 
defining developments in the history of our species. Darwin (1871) considered 
language to be the greatest invention of humankind, only equalled by fire, and 
Maynard Smith & Szathmáry (1995) include language on their list of only eight 
“major evolutionary transitions”, alongside e.g. chromosomes or sexual repro-
duction. Christiansen & Kirby (2003) call the evolutionary emergence of language 
“the hardest problem in science”, a label that is as bold as it is useful: Its last part 
underscores the progression of academic interest in language origins from the 
spheres of mythology, religion and philosophising to the domain of scientific in-
vestigation. Language evolution understood as a field of study (or “the Science of 
Language Evolution”; Żywiczyński 2018) is an interdisciplinary research field 
concerned with addressing this problem (see, e.g., the collection of papers in Tall-
erman & Gibson 2012 for an overview). 
 However, language is itself a natural language word that is fuzzy and poly-
semous, and as such eludes precise definitions. To a great extent, the same can be 
said of the diverse conceptualizations and technical uses of language promoted by 
the different branches of linguistics. Many have viewed the elusive nature of the 
term language as an inherent stumbling block to progress, lamenting the fact that 
researchers do not ‘talk about the same thing’ when discussing the evolution of 
language (e.g., Wescott 1991, Botha 2000, Hauser et al. 2002; see also Jackendoff 
2010, Haspelmath 2016). In particular, many approaches use the term language to 
refer to a socially shared external code and see this as the explanandum of lan-
guage evolution research, whereas other approaches are interested in language as 
a cognitive system, and still others as a biological entity, such as a genetically 
specified faculty or as a component part of the human brain (see Balari & Lorenzo 
2016). Attempts to specify this explanatory target with more precise technical ter-
minology have remained unsuccessful, and although the ontological complexity 
of language admittedly plays a role, to a large extent this is because different the-
oretical stances presuppose different conceptions of what constitutes language 
“proper”. 
 
2. Criticisms of the Conceptual Diversity of Language 
Disagreements on the nature of language have always been present in the modern 
era of language evolution research, which to many starts in 1996 with the launch 
of the Evolang conference series, “the major meeting for researchers worldwide 
in the origins and evolution of language” (http://evolang.org). This first meeting 
resulted in a proceedings volume (Hurford et al. 1998) that was scrutinised by 
Rudolf Botha, himself one of the pioneers of the Evolang movement. Botha (2000) 
lists thirteen conceptualisations of language that can be found in this single vol-
ume: ‘aspect of human behavior’, ‘process’, ‘gigantic meta-task’, ‘special human 
skill’, ‘activity’, ‘species-specific capacity’, ‘sort of contract signed by members of 
a community’, ‘hard-wired (individual) competence’, group behaviour of social 
animals, application of Theory of Mind and social intelligence, ‘mass phenome-
non actualized by different agents interacting with each other’, emergent property 
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that spontaneously forms itself, and ‘complex system of labels for concepts and 
conceptual structures’. From this, Botha (2000) concludes that the 
 
[…] profusion of ontologically distinct ways of characterizing lan-
guage is symptomatic of a foundational flaw in work on language evo-
lution: it indicates the absence of a shared, well-founded linguistic on-
tology.                  (2000: 152) 
 
He goes on to suggest that “[t]he linguistic entity or entities whose evolution is at 
issue should be identified and characterized in a clear and non-arbitrary way”, 
and that a lack of such a consensus is a fundamental stumbling block to progress:  
 
[I]n the absence of broad agreement about what language is as op-
posed to other linguistic entities, discussions [of language evolution] 
are bound to deal with questions of language evolution in ways that 
are inconclusive and internally disconnected. 1 
(Botha 2000: 149, 152–153) 
 
 A similar critique—also catalysed by an Evolang meeting (2002 in Har-
vard)—was voiced in the consequential Science paper by Marc Hauser, Noam 
Chomsky, and Tecumseh Fitch. The founding premise of these authors was that 
“[t]he word ‘language’ has highly divergent meanings in different contexts and 
disciplines” (Hauser et al. 2002: 1570) and is simply too capacious to be produc-
tively used in scientific discourse without further specification.3 Hauser et al. 
(2002) propose a remedy in the form of a more circumscribed and thus supposedly 
more scientifically productive notion of (the biological faculty of) language, which 
they term the faculty of language in the narrow sense, FLN, as separate from the 
faculty of language in the broad sense, FLB. We return to this distinction in section 
3; here we underscore that the paper and the distinction essentially resulted from 
a deep dissatisfaction with the breadth and polysemy of the everyday word lan-
guage, and the resulting diversity in its use in language evolution research. This is 
particularly evident in later commentaries, where the authors explain that their 
motivation behind proposing FLN was “to clarify misunderstandings and aid in-
terdisciplinary rapprochement” (Fitch et al. 2005: 179), and 
 
 
1  Similar and equally influential criticisms were also voiced before Evolang. For example, 
“[o]ne of the reasons for the extremely inconclusive outcome of scholarly debates on the 
origin and evolution of language is that so few glossogonists define language in the same 
way. Yet because their definitions, in most cases, remain implicit, definitional differences are 
rarely acknowledged. Before we can distinguish terminological disagreements from substan-
tive disagreements, we must, I think, be as explicit as possible about what each of us means 
by the word ‘language’” (Wescott 1991: 77). 
3  Cf. Bolhuis et al. (2014: 1): “In our view, for the purposes of scientific understanding, language 
should be understood as a particular computational cognitive system, implemented neurally, 
that cannot be equated with an excessively expansive notion of ‘language as communication’. 
[…] In place of a complex rule system or accounts grounded on general notions of ‘culture’ 
or ‘communication,’ it appears that human language syntax can be defined in an extremely 
simple way that makes conventional evolutionary explanations much simpler.” 
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[…] to clarify discussion and avoid confusion, once we realized that 
researchers (including ourselves) had been using the same word, ‘lan-
guage’, to talk about two different things (FLB and FLN) for many 
years, and thus had been talking past each other. 
(Fitch 2010: 22) 
 
 A related but more recent concern was a much-discussed terminological cri-
tique by Martin Haspelmath, commenting on the foundation of the Journal of Lan-
guage Evolution (which, next to Evolang, was another institutional milestone to 
language evolution research; see Dediu & de Boer 2016). While the target of 
Haspelmath’s (2016) commentary is the term evolution and its apparent semantic 
extension from ‘language origins’ to ‘language emergence and language change’, 
it also targets language by extension, since the types of processes that are included 
under the rubric “evolutionary” predetermine the range of entities they apply to. 
Haspelmath criticises the resulting lack of clarity and terminological rigour: 
 
As usual, this semantic change of ‘evolution’ has happened because 
different communities are interested in different concepts, and people 
(including scientists) are reluctant to coin new terms for new concepts, 
preferring to adopt old terms from neighbouring communities. More-
over, even linguists tend to be unaware of semantic changes and thus 
sloppy about terminological use.4       (Haspelmath 2016) 
 
In a recent paper, Haspelmath (2020) has coined the cover term human linguisti-
cality, understood as a biological capacity which is best studied in a broadly com-
parative perspective and which imposes some constraints on possible language 
systems, but with most similarities between languages resulting from convergent 
cultural evolution. As he explains, this was done to avoid “confusing terminology 
(‘language faculty’, ‘universal grammar’) [that] has often clouded the substantive 
issues in the past.”  
 All in all, these examples show that the terminological fuzziness surround-
ing the notion of language in language evolution research has been subject to 
much criticism. In the remainder of this paper, we will defend a position directly 
opposed to these influential voices, and to a degree contrary to standard intui-
tions. We will claim that agreement on the ontology of language is not a sine qua 
non for good and productive research in language evolution, and question not 
 
4  Following up on Haspelmath’s comment, Mendívil-Giró (2019) argues that the concepts of 
language evolution and change should be kept apart. He defines language as “a historically 
modified mental organ” and argues that language change gives rise to language diversity, as 
new languages can develop out of another language. This process, however, is distinct from 
the emergence of language from non-language, which, he argues, is beyond the scope of his-
torical linguistics and rather brought about by processes studied in evolutionary biology. 
However, he also acknowledges that whether or not language evolution and change are seen 
as a continuum depends on the underlying conceptualisation of language: While he defends 
the view of language as externalisation patterns of a species-specific Faculty of Language, he 
concedes that “the conflation of the process of linguistic change and the process of the evolu-
tion of FL is natural in those approaches that conceive of languages as social and cultural 
objects.” 
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only whether such an agreement may be possible, but also whether it would be 
necessarily desirable. 
 As our main point, we question the value of a single top-down notion of 
language. Such a definition seems not to be possible for language evolution as a 
field of research both because of the nature of highly interdisciplinary scientific 
practice in the field and due to the special and multi-faceted ontology of language 
as an object of study. The only type of overarching definition of language is a 
bottom-up one, as a family-resemblance notion derived from the patterns of use 
of the word language in everyday language(s) and reflected in the patterns of ac-
tual research practice. This leads to definitions of language evolution that could 
be seen as disappointingly broad and possibly circular, as in “[l]anguage evolu-
tion researchers are interested in the processes that led to a qualitative change 
from a non-linguistic state to a linguistic one” or “[w]e can characterise the study 
of language evolution as being concerned with the emergence of language out of 
non-language” (Scott-Phillips & Kirby 2010: 412). However, a ‘usage-based’ un-
derstanding of language and language evolution has the virtue of actually capturing 
how these terms function in the scientific community of language evolution re-
searchers. 
 In addition—and again largely as a consequence of the nature of scientific 
practice—we suggest that conceptual diversity may actually have beneficial con-
sequences. In short, even though there are considerable differences in the under-
standing of language (resulting in differences in the understanding of the explan-
atory goal of the entire enterprise of language evolution research), this does not 
necessarily imply incommensurability (see especially Pleyer & Hartmann 2019 for 
a supporting argument). It also does not necessarily hinder local progress on in-
dividual phenomena relevant to the understanding of language evolution, and 
further, may even be conducive to progress more globally and thus benefit the 
entire field of research. 
 
3. FLN/FLB 
We return to the distinction mentioned in Section 2, between the faculty of lan-
guage in the narrow versus broad sense (FLN/FLB; Hauser et al. 2002), which for 
several reasons provides a perfect case in point. Not least among these reasons is 
the central status of FLN/FLB to language evolution research, and even beyond: 
it is one of the very few terminological-conceptual exports from the field of lan-
guage evolution to the study of language and cognition at large, included in im-
portant linguistic and interdisciplinary tertiary literature such as The Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy (Cowie 2008) or The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics 
(Tincoff & Hauser 2006). Likewise, the original source of the distinction, the paper 
by Hauser et al. (2002) already mentioned above is doubtlessly among the most 
influential works in the field, and probably its most widely cited article (5,716 
Google Scholar cites as of 11 April 2020).5 
 
5  The rest of this section develops an argument originally stated in Wacewicz (2012). 
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 In what follows we will not discuss the content and agenda of Hauser et al. 
(2002) and the ensuing debates in detail.6 Instead, we focus on establishing two 
points that are central to the rest of our argument: 
 
(1) The proponents of FLN have defined it twice, in fundamentally dis-
crepant ways: the definition originally formulated in Hauser et al. 
(2002) and the one later formulated in Fitch et al. (2005) describe two 
distinct entities (not simply different versions of the same entity). 
(2) This fundamental discrepancy has remained virtually completely un-
recognised in the literature, which does not appear to have had major 
consequences for language evolution research, even in frameworks 
that explicitly adopt and rely on the FLN/FLB distinction. 
 
 In sum, the notion of FLN is a highest-profile case in point, serving to illus-
trate that even a very fundamental confusion about the explicit, top-down defini-
tion of a central notion—(the faculty of) language—can remain in the background 
of actual research practice, without readily perceptible detrimental effects. 
 
3.1. The 2002 vs. 2005 Definitions of FLN 
3.1.1. The 2002 Definition of FLN 
In their original paper, Hauser et al. (2002) define FLN as the “computational 
core” of the language faculty: The cognitive subsystem responsible for generating 
the discrete infinity of linguistic expressions. FLN so defined is a term internal to 
linguistic theory, and the distinction between FLN and FLB is one based solely on 
a particular theoretical account of language (and thus of ‘the language faculty’). 
On this original definition, FLN is one part of the more general faculty of language 
in the broad sense (FLB), which also includes at least two other major components: 
the sensorimotor (SM) subsystem and the conceptual-intentional (CI) subsystem, 
which Hauser et al. (2002) illustrate with examples but do not explain in further 
detail. 
 Although later misinterpreted (see below), the definition of FLN as the 
“computational core” is quite unambiguous, and systematically recurs through-
out the paper, for example: 
 
Faculty of language–broad sense (FLB). FLB includes an internal compu-
tational system (FLN, below) combined with at least two other organ-
ism-internal systems, which we call “sensory-motor” and “conceptual-
intentional”.  (Hauser et al. 2002: 1569–1570 [italics in the original]) 
 
 
6  Readers of Biolinguistics are likely familiar with the Hauser–Chomsky–Fitch vs. Pinker and 
Jackendoff debate (Hauser et al. 2002, Pinker & Jackendoff 2005, Jackendoff & Pinker 2005, 
Fitch et al. 2005), on which there is a large body of existing commentaries (see, e.g., Parker 
2006, Wacewicz 2007, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2008, Balari & Lorenzo 2012, Barceló-Co-
blijn 2012, Wróbel 2012, Boeckx 2012).  
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FLB includes sensory-motor, conceptual-intentional, and other possi-
ble systems (which we leave open); FLN includes the core grammatical 
computations that we suggest are limited to recursion. 
(Hauser et al. 2002: 1570 [Figure 2, caption]) 
 
Faculty of language–narrow sense (FLN). FLN is the abstract linguistic 
computational system alone, independent of the other systems with 
which it interacts and interfaces. 
(Hauser et al. 2002: 1571 [italics in the original]) 
 
It is important to observe that Hauser et al. (2002) discuss the property of ‘unique-
ness to humans’ and tag it, clearly and repeatedly, as a hypothesis about FLN. 
 
By this hypothesis, FLB contains a wide variety of cognitive and percep-
tual mechanisms shared with other species, but only those mechanisms 
underlying FLN—particularly its capacity for discrete infinity—are uniquely 
human.        (Hauser et al. 2002: 1573 [emphasis added]) 
 
Second, although we have argued that most if not all of FLB is shared 
with other species, whereas FLN may be unique to humans, this repre-
sents a tentative, testable hypothesis in need of further empirical inves-
tigation.        (Hauser et al. 2002: 1576 [emphasis added]) 
 
Hypothesis 3: Only FLN is uniquely human. 
(Hauser et al. 2002: 1573 [italics in the original]) 
 
3.1.2. The 2005 Definition of FLN 
As stated above, the 2005 article by Fitch, Hauser, and Chomsky (published as a 
reply to Pinker & Jackendoff 2005) provides a different definition of the FLN/FLB 
distinction. Fitch et al. (2005) claim there that FLN is defined as being unique to 
both humans and language: 
 
[…] given that language as a whole is unique to our species, it seems 
likely that some subset of the mechanisms of FLB is both unique to 
humans, and to language itself. We dubbed this subset of mechanisms 
the faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN). 
(Fitch et al. 2005: 180–181) 
 
We thus made the further, and independent, terminological proposal 
to denote that subset of FLB that is both specific to language and to 
humans as FLN. To repeat a central point in our paper: FLN is com-
posed of those components of the overall faculty of language (FLB) 
that are both unique to humans and unique to or clearly specialized 
for language.              (Fitch et al. 2005: 182) 
 




In sum, the two papers by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch reverse the relation be-
tween the essential-cum-definitional and the accidental-cum-hypothetical proper-
ties of FLN (Figure 1). The 2002 paper defines FLN as a computational core and 
hypothesises its human uniqueness; conversely, the 2005 paper defines FLN as 
uniquely human and hypothesises that it includes a computational core (Table 1). 
As one example of the consequences, if we accept the 2005 definition of FLN as that 
which is ‘both unique to humans and unique to or clearly specialized for lan-
guage’, then an unpacked Hypothesis 3 from the 2002 text effectively becomes 
only that which is uniquely human (and linguistic) is uniquely human. This is why—
emphatically—the 2002 and 2005 definitions are not just different variants of the 
same definition, but two different definitions that are discrepant in a strong sense. 
Unsurprisingly, they produce different answers to consequential questions, such 
as ‘Can homologous traits be part of FLN?’ Further, they cause a number of literal 
contradictions, for example:  
 
The contents of FLN are to be empirically determined, and could pos-
sibly be empty, if empirical findings showed that none of the mecha-
nisms involved are uniquely human or unique to language, and that 
only the way they are integrated is specific to human language. The 
distinction itself is intended as a terminological aid to interdisciplinary 
discussion and rapprochement, and obviously does not constitute a testa-
ble hypothesis.       (Fitch et al. 2005: 180–181 [emphasis added]) 
 
Second, although we have argued that most if not all of FLB is shared 
with other species, whereas FLN may be unique to humans, this rep-
resents a tentative, testable hypothesis in need of further empirical in-
vestigation.      (Hauser et al. 2002: 1576 [emphasis added]) 
 
3.2. Reception and Takeaway 
Interestingly, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch themselves have never addressed the 
inconsistency and may even remain unaware of it. In Fitch et al. (2005: 181–183), 
the authors maintain that the later, 2005, definition, and hence the ‘uniqueness to 
humans’ criterion,  was  in place  in  the  original paper  (which, as demonstrated 
Figure 1:  The FLB/FLN distinction in Hauser et al. 2002 (left) and in Fitch et al. 2005 (right). 
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 FLN in Hauser et al. (2002) FLN in Fitch et al. (2005) 
Definition FLN is the core computational mechanism of the FLB. 
FLN is the part of FLB that 
is unique to humans and 
unique to language. 
Hypotheses 
• FLN is the part of FLB that is 
unique to humans (i.e. FLN 
is unique to humans, and no 
other part of FLB is). 
• FLN can be equated with re-
cursion. 
Only recursion is unique to 
humans. 
Table 1:  Definitions of, and hypotheses about, FLN in Hauser et al. 2002 vs. in Fitch et al. 2005. 
 
above, is incorrect). In later work, they continue to use the term FLN in these two 
incompatible senses, for example: 
 
FLN—and especially the mechanism of recursion—was defined by 
Hauser et al. (2002) as a computational process that is responsible for 
the generative and hierarchical properties of narrow syntax. 
(Tincoff & Hauser 2006: 536) 
 
HCF proposed a distinction between the faculty of language in the 
broad [FLB] and narrow sense [FLN]. FLB is simply those processes of 
the mind that are both necessary and sufficient to support language. 
Thus, for example, attention is involved in language processing but is 
neither unique to language nor unique to humans. FLN includes those 
processes that are both uniquely human and unique to language... 
HCF hypothesized that FLN, though potentially an empty set, may 
only include the computational resources subserving recursion and 
their interface or mapping to the conceptual-intentional [semantics] 
and sensory-motor [phonetic] systems.     (Hauser et al. 2007: 105) 
 
 As for the larger community, the discrepancy seems to have been essentially 
overlooked in the rather sizable body of commentaries that followed in the wake 
of the original FLN paper and the debate of Hauser et al. with Pinker and Jacken-
doff. Most interestingly, the rejoinder by Jackendoff & Pinker (2005) does not 
clearly expose the discrepancy, but instead proceeds to address the revised defi-
nition by Fitch et al. (2005). Other commentators tacitly assume FLN to only have 
a single definition, sticking to either the 2002 ‘computational core’ definition (e.g. 
Armstrong & Wilcox 2007, Johansson 2005, Kurcz 2004, Lewandowska-To-
maszczyk 2008) or to the 2005 ‘uniquely human + uniquely linguistic’ definition 
(e.g., Okanoya 2007, Parker 2006, Számadó & Szathmáry 2006). It is not uncom-
mon to see the 2005 definition incorrectly attributed to the 2002 paper, such as in 
Samuels (2009: 356): “Hauser et al. (2002) define FLN as those aspects of the lan-
guage faculty that are unique both to humans and to language”. Occasionally, 
S. Wacewicz et al. 
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commentators equivocate between the two interpretations, conflate them or use 
them interchangeably without noting their mutual incompatibility (e.g., Kinsella 
2009). 
 In summing up this part of our argument, we wish to underscore that the 
definitional problem itself, that is the existence of two parallel definitions of FLN, 
is not unusual in science (since competing definitions of technical terms are com-
monplace) and is tangential to our present interests. Again, the point we make 
here is not that the definitional discrepancy exists; rather, our point is how the 
discrepancy has continued to go essentially unnoticed. However surprising—and 
contrary to an earlier analysis by one of us (Wacewicz 2012)—this provides a strik-
ing demonstration that the specific wording of the top-down definitions of lan-
guage was inconsequential to the research practice of the field. 
 In the next section, we will focus on a number of approaches that have led 
to significant progress in the field regardless of the fact that they do not directly 
map onto the different definitions of FLN/FLB. Instead, they represent ‘multi-
component’ approaches to language evolution (cf. Fitch 2017, Benítez-Burraco & 
Progovac 2020) that outline important aspects of ‘language’ and ‘language evolu-
tion’ and eschew the kind of restrictive definitions outlined in Section 3. As such, 
these approaches are further evidence of our view that the definitional discrepan-
cies discussed above did not hinder progress in the field. Instead, these ap-
proaches show the importance not of top-down definitions of language, but of 
focusing on particular aspects of and hypotheses about language and investigat-
ing their relation to other factors relevant to language and its evolution (see also 
Roberts et al. 2020). 
 
4. Language as a Family Resemblance Category in Language Evolution 
Research 
In this section, we flesh out our argument with a brief survey of presently influ-
ential lines of language evolution research. Our main goal here is to illustrate the 
current breadth of the field and show how this breadth brings with it conceptual 
diversity as an inevitable consequence. We propose a categorisation into four gen-
eral approaches that constitutively differ in how they conceptualise language, 
where ‘constitutiv’ means such differences that preclude a neat grouping under a 
single common definition. Nevertheless, we wish to show that these conceptuali-
sations are not entirely disjunct but are in fact characterised by patterns of over-
lapping similarities—in other words, these uses of language form a family resem-
blance category. As an additional point, we also mention some benefits of this 
conceptual diversity, i.e. ways in which these four approaches have been mutu-
ally valuable and invigorating. We will first discuss conceptualisations of lan-
guage as a multimodal phenomenon (Section 4.1), before turning to approaches 
that treat language as a complex adaptive system (Section 4.2). We will then dis-
cuss approaches that see language as a form of social interaction (Section 4.3), and 
finally we will explore approaches that look at language from the perspective of 
the language-ready brain (Section 4.4). 
 Since, as we emphasise in Section 5, language evolution is a fast-changing 
field, we focus on approaches that we consider as particularly prolific and 
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impactful in the last decade. As such, these approaches also represent trends 
likely to further gain in importance in the near future (see also Nölle et al. 2020). 
However, such a selection can never aspire to being fully objective, and in partic-
ular our temporal perspective means leaving out foundational work by highly 
prominent but early language evolution scholars, such as Bickerton (1990), Dun-
bar (1996), Deacon (1997) or Jackendoff (2002). Such works were central to the 
inception of language evolution as a science, and are still used as reference points 
for the discussion of specific topics in the modern day science of language evolu-
tion—for instance, Bickerton and Jackendoff often feature in debates about the 
nature of protolanguage (e.g., Fitch 2010), and Dunbar’s views are referenced with 
regard to the problem of the social preconditions of language emergence (e.g., Dor 
et al. 2014, Zlatev 2014). 
 
4.1. Language as a Multimodal Phenomenon 
One approach that has become ever more popular in the last decade sees language 
as a multimodal phenomenon. As Vigliocco et al. (2014) forcefully argue, “speech 
signals are invariably accompanied by visual information on the face and in man-
ual gesture” (Vigliocco et al. 2014: 1). Such a view differs considerably from more 
traditional conceptualisations, on which non-verbal behaviour (e.g., as defined 
and taxonomised in the seminal paper by Ekman & Friesen 1969), and primarily 
gesture, supports but is definitionally separate from linguistic communication. 
This definitional framework has very profound consequences for language evo-
lution: Since gesture and occasionally other forms of non-verbal communication 
are inseparable from (spoken) language, it follows that even though the nonverbal 
component and the verbal component may be analytically distinct, their evolu-
tionary origins constitute an indivisible explanatory target. In other words, at least 
for the purposes of explaining its evolutionary origins, gesture must be consid-
ered as an integral part of language. In the remainder of this section, we illustrate 
the view of language as a multimodal phenomenon by discussing three exem-
plary frameworks, focusing on the question of how language is conceptualised in 
each of these approaches: Adam Kendon’s idea of languaging, David McNeill’s 
growth point, and Jordan Zlatev’s mimesis hierarchy. 
 
4.1.1. Adam Kendon: Languaging 
Adam Kendon rejects the traditional idea that a language forms an abstract sys-
tem of rules (as proposed by e.g. de Saussure 1916), and opposes the view that 
language has systemic properties. Instead, Kendon (e.g. 1990, 2004) takes a dy-
namic, usage-oriented view, whose roots can be traced back to Humboldt’s ener-
geia and more recently to Goffman’s interactionism. Kendon (e.g. 2014a, 2017) 
sometimes uses the term languaging, to underline the dynamic character of lan-
guage, or gesture-speech ensemble (Kendon 2004: 108), to underline its multimodal 
character. He argues that language involves “the mobilization of several different 
semiotic systems in different modalities and deployed in an orchestrated relation-
ship with one another” (Kendon 2014a). The most linguistic element of this or-
chestration is speech, which has linear structure and is organised by the morpho-
S. Wacewicz et al. 
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syntactic component (Kendon 2014a). However, as Kendon insists, “the ‘natural’ 
state of spoken language” (Kendon 2014b: 76) is the context of physical “co-pres-
ence”, in which the transmission of meaning, both propositional and non-propo-
sitional, depends on speech being coordinated with “extra-oral bodily action”—
hand and arm movements, postural shifts, eye contact or facial expressions (Ken-
don 2004, 2011). The traditional focus on the systemic properties of language re-
sults from abstracting it from this “natural” state, and language so construed is of 
secondary importance both in ontogenetic and evolutionary terms (Kendon 
2014b: 72). 
 The basic unit of language (or alternatively, ‘languaging’) is the utterance, 
which is the coming-together of speech and extra-oral visible action to translate 
ideas into “observable behavior, which may be read by others as reportive of those 
ideas” (Kendon 1980: 208; see also Kendon 2004). The meaning, including propo-
sitional meaning, of an utterance results from an interplay of speech and extra-
oral bodily visual actions. Importantly, Kendon sees extra-oral visible bodily ac-
tion as so closely coordinated with speaking that it has to be understood as an 
integral component of language. The idea of language as the interaction and co-
expression of speech and body movement is of crucial importance to Kendon’s 
view on language origins. He subscribes to a uniformitarian hypothesis, accord-
ing to which “the early steps of language evolution also consisted of multi-modal 
signals, instead of being predominantly hand-based or vocalization based” (Ken-
don 2014b: 69). Hence, he looks for such an evolutionary context that could ex-
plain an early integration between vocal-auditory and visual-bodily semiotic re-
sources and argues for a praxic origin of language—in other words, he argues that 
language is rooted in concrete actions. Accordingly, there was one, albeit com-
plex, executive system for oral-laryngeal and manual action, which served such 
purposes as mastication and food-handling (cf. MacNeilage 2008). Later, this sys-
tem was rededicated “in the service of communicative action” (Kendon 2014b: 
72): Articulated vocalisation developed early in the hominin line to manage and 
maintain complex social relations; gesture, understood broadly as deliberate and 
expressive-communicative movement, also emerged early from the primary prac-
tical, manipulatory function of the hand and forelimb. On Kendon’s view, the 
common origin of speech and gesture (as defined above), as well as the same evo-
lutionary trajectory (from the praxic to the communicative function), explains 
what he refers to as “the ‘natural’ state of language” (see above): 
 
[…] gestures that are so often a part of speaking are neither supple-
ments nor add-ons. They are integral to speaking. They are so because 
they are derived from practical manipulatory actions from which 
speaking itself is also derived. Looked at in this way, we can better 
understand why it is that visible bodily action is mobilized when 
speakers speak and why, more generally, when language is used in co-
present interaction it always involves poly-modalic forms of action. 
(Kendon 2014b: 75) 
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 To support his scenario, Kendon extensively appeals to research on the in-
tegration of speech and gesture in the communication of modern humans, but 
also to developmental and neurocognitive evidence, such as the coordination of 
syllabic babbling with hand movements (Kendon 2014a, cf. Ejiri & Masataka 2001) 
or the role of Broca’s area in controlling hand movements as well as movements 
of the expressive muscles of the face (Kendon 2014b: 69, cf. Willems et al. 2007, 
Aboitiz 2012). Kendon argues against the view that asserts continuity between 
ape gestural communication and modern human gestures, which has been em-
phasised by gestural accounts of language origin (e.g., Hewes 1977, Arbib 2012, 
Corballis 2013). 
 
4.1.2. David McNeill: Growth Points 
In McNeill’s model, speech and gesture synergistically express the same overall 
meanings while remaining semiotically distinct and responsible for the transmis-
sion of different aspects of the message: speech for propositional content and ges-
tures for imagistic content. According to McNeill, the stroke (i.e. the most pro-
nounced phase) of a gesture accompanies the semantically most prominent ele-
ment of the utterance. In this way, the Growth Point, the basic unit of thinking, 
becomes externalised. Here, McNeill departs from Kendon’s account of modern 
human communication, which does not posit a categorical division of labour be-
tween speech and gesture, but rather argues for their functional interplay, for ex-
ample, gesture can transmit propositional aspects of meaning (see above), while 
speech includes vocal means of expressing emotional-imagistic content, as in the 
case of paralinguistic features (e.g., emotional prosody) or iconic vocal phenom-
ena, as in ideophones, phonesthemes, reduplication or word lengthening (Ken-
don 2008). They also disagree about the definition of gesture. McNeill (1992, 2012) 
would further limit (prototypical) gestures (i.e. co-speech gestures) to spontane-
ous and idiosyncratic hand and arm movements that are functionally integrated 
with speech. As we have seen, Kendon’s understanding of gesture extends be-
yond the category of co-speech gestures and embraces any deliberately commu-
nicative bodily movement (hence, the use of the term ‘kinesic’), including postural 
shifts, eye contact or facial expressions (Kendon 2004, 2011). 
 The idea of a tight integration between spoken messages and co-speech ges-
ture is also central to McNeill’s theory of language evolution, the critical moment 
of which is the integration of gestural and vocal communication, both at the level 
of cognition and expression (McNeill 2012). The claim is that language originated 
from the coming together of vocalisation and gesture to form a propositional-    
imagistic dialectic. Like Kendon, McNeill submits a uniformitarian explanation as 
the rationale of his hypothesis: language in its beginnings was qualitatively simi-
lar to what it is now; but it should be remembered that he proposes a more limited 
view of what language is than Kendon. The critical element in the formation of 
the propositional-imagistic dialectic was the ‘twisting’ of mirror neurons, where-
by they began “to respond to one’s own gestures, as if they were from someone 
else” (McNeill 2012: 65). To support this idea, McNeill paraphrases Mead (1974): 
“[A] gesture is a meaningful symbol to the extent that it arouses in the one making 
it the same response it arouses in someone witnessing it” (2012: 180; cf. Arbib’s 
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parity requirement in Section 4.4.1 below). As this gestural system was co-orches-
trated with vocalisation, the Growth Point emerged.  
 It should be noted that McNeill does not provide any evolutionarily 
grounded pressures that could have been responsible for these changes. In fact, 
he ventures two rather different accounts of how speech started, deriving it either 
from ingestion, which assumed vocal properties and was subsequently orches-
trated with gesture (2012: 180–181), or from the type of communication that is 
found in extant non-human apes, such as “chimp gestures with vocalization” 
(2012: 195). Although McNeill refers to the ‘twisting’ of mirror neurons and the 
voice-gesture integration as adaptations, he actually describes them as saltational 
leaps, not unlike Chomsky’s idea of a lucky mutation giving rise to the operation 
of Merge, which first endowed humans with a language of thought and then with 
the communicative use of it (Berwick & Chomsky 2016).  
 
4.1.3. Jordan Zlatev: The Mimesis Hierarchy 
A different account of language and language evolution is put forward by Zlatev 
(2008, among others). Zlatev objects to the very term ‘multimodality’ as used by 
Kendon and McNeill (but also many other researchers, see e.g., Wacewicz & 
Żywiczyński 2017); for him, language and gesture are two distinct semiotic sys-
tems, i.e. systems of signs and relations between them (Zlatev et al. 2020), which 
are characterised by different design features. For instance, linguistic signs are 
mainly conventional, gestural signs mainly iconic; the syntagmatic relations be-
tween linguistic signs are compositional, between gestural signs, they are linear; 
language uses double articulation, gesture does not. Next, language can utilise 
different modalities: Vocal in the case of speech, material in the case of writing, 
bodily in the case of signed languages, and so on (Żywiczyński & Zlatev, in press). 
Hence, face-to-face communication is typically both polysemiotic, that is it makes 
use of different semiotic systems (most importantly, language and gesture), and 
multimodal, that is it makes use of different communication channels (most im-
portantly, vocal for speech and bodily for gesture; Zlatev 2019).  
 Zlatev’s key theoretical concept is mimesis, adapted from Donald (1991, 
2001). His most recent definition of bodily mimesis is the following: 
  
[…] [A]n act of cognition or communication is an act of bodily mimesis 
if: (1) it involves a cross-modal mapping between exteroception (e.g. vi-
sion) and proprioception (e.g. kinesthesia);  (2) it is under conscious con-
trol and is perceived by the subject to be similar to some other action, object 
or event, (3) the subject intends the act to stand for some action, object 
or event for an addressee, and for the addressee to recognize this inten-
tion; (4) it is not fully conventional and normative, and (5) it does not divide 
(semi)compositionally into meaningful sub-acts that systematically relate 
to other similar acts, as in grammar.        (Zlatev 2014: 206) 
 
 On this basis, Zlatev proposes an evolutionary and developmental model 
known as the mimesis hierarchy (Zlatev, 2008). The rudimentary form of proto-mi-
mesis, based on requirement (1), is found in activities like emotional and 
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attentional contagion, and is common for all primates. The more advanced form 
of dyadic mimesis (based on 1 and 2) involves volition and imitation, but not true 
representation or sign-function; it is common for all great apes. Only at the next 
level (based on 1, 2 and 3), referred to as triadic mimesis, do mimetic acts gain a 
clear sign-function, as well as Gricean communicative intentions (i.e. that the ad-
dressee should understand that a communicative act is being performed for their 
benefit). Further, point (4) distinguishes mimesis from a conventionalised proto-
language and point (5) from language proper. 
 This provides a useful conceptual apparatus, but does not answer key ques-
tions such as what drove the evolutionary process, as well as more specific aspects 
of how the transition from triadic mimesis (i.e. pantomime) to protolanguage and 
language took place, including the shift from a dominance of gesture to a domi-
nance of vocalisation. Zlatev (2016) addresses these gaps, but in a somewhat sche-
matic matter. With respect to evolutionary pressures, Zlatev appeals to an in-
crease of pro-sociality in hominins (cf. Tomasello 2008), which might in turn have 
been ecologically driven by the reproductive strategy of cooperative breeding, 
where the biological parents receive help in rearing their young from the wider 
group (Hrdy 2009). Concerning the gradual transition to vocalisation, this is 
sought in the nature of pantomime itself: a hybrid system that is polysemiotic (i.e. 
combines various sign and signal systems) and multimodal (i.e. involves different 
sensory channels). The dominant semiotic system in pantomime is claimed to 
have been robustly iconic gesture (cf. the notion of primary iconicity; Sonesson 
1997). The transition towards language entailed a gradual loss in iconicity along 
various parameters (see Zlatev et al. 2020 for details). Zlatev (2016) attempts to 
motivate the gradual transition from gesture to vocalisation when the need for 
less iconicity and more ‘arbitrariness’ arose.  
 But while language (realised as speech, writing or signing) may be the dom-
inant system in modern human communication when it comes to expressing 
propositions and narratives, it is rarely used alone, but alongside other semiotic 
systems such as gesture and depiction (e.g. Green 2014): Polysemiotic communi-
cation. An advantage of the mimesis/pantomime approach is that it can help ex-
plain this, as pantomime consisted of gesture, vocalisations as well as ‘proto-
drawing’, when gestures left marks on surfaces such as sand (Zlatev 2019, Zlatev 
et al. 2020).  
 
4.1.4. Language as a Multimodal Phenomenon: Taking Stock 
The defining feature of the views on language discussed above is its multimodal 
character. However, the term ‘multimodality’, especially as used by Kendon and 
McNeill, conflates multimodality itself, i.e. the use of different sensory modalities, 
with polysemioticity, that is the use of different sign systems, most importantly 
speech and gesture. Beyond the general consensus that language is multimodal, 
there are differences in the way these approaches account for language and its 
separability from other semiotic systems. For McNeill and Kendon (cf. the latter’s 
idea of languaging), language and gesture are two manifestations of the same sys-
tem—importantly, this system is at its core both communicative and cognitive. 
Zlatev enumerates criterial attributes of language, in contradistinction to the 
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criterial attributes of gesture, but emphasises that human-specific communication 
is nevertheless inherently multimodal and polysemiotic; hence, language should 
be seen as cognitively distinct from the semiotic system of gesture and other se-
miotic resources but is inseparable from them in actual communicative behaviour. 
In this regard, his position is similar to that of Levinson (see Section 4.3 below). 
 All of these authors underline that language is species-specific, but they also 
posit its continuity with ape cognition and communication, albeit with various 
degrees of emphasis. They also agree about the watershed in the evolution of lan-
guage, which was of semiotic nature and consisted in the emergence of iconic ges-
tures, although again, they differ in their account of how abrupt the semiotic 
breakthrough was. Related to that point is the division of labour between biolog-
ical and cultural evolution. In multimodal approaches, the bulk of biological pre-
adaptations for language, mainly related to the organisation of the neural infra-
structure, happened prior to the semiotic breakthrough and facilitated it. The later 
course of language evolution was almost exclusively the domain of cultural evo-
lution, which led to the emergence of arbitrary symbols and grammar. In account-
ing for both protolinguistic beginnings of language and its later phases, the mul-
timodal approaches emphasise the importance of cognitive and social factors, for 
example, the development of complex forms of Theory of Mind, intentionality or 
cooperation, and treat modern language as integrated in the human socio-cogni-
tive niche. In this regard, they are highly compatible with theories that treat lan-
guage both as a complex adaptive system and as a form of social interaction. 
 
4.2. Language as a Complex Adaptive System 
Another influential perspective on language in language evolution is constituted 
by approaches that view language as complex adaptive systems (CAS) that 
emerges from social interaction across the timescales of biological evolution, cul-
tural evolution and ontogenetic development (e.g., Steels 2000; Beckner et al. 2009; 
Kirby 2012). These approaches place different points of emphasis on particular 
aspects of complex-adaptive processes—some stress their direct relevance to lan-
guage emergence; others focus on the (socio-)cognitive mechanisms that underlie 
them. However, we discuss them together as they share the underlying view of 
language as being multifactorial and dynamic, and whose evolution is channelled 
by cognitive, interactive-communicational and cultural-historical contexts. 
 Complex adaptive systems are defined as “processes involving a number of 
interacting parts which give rise to emergent processes that show the appearance 
of design.” (Kirby 2012: 590). This idea has gained momentum in both theoretical 
and empirical approaches in language evolution. On a more theoretical plane, it 
has been adopted by many practitioners of usage-based approaches, for example, 
those resonating with Construction Grammar and Cognitive Linguistics (see, e.g., 
Pleyer & Winters 2014). But it has also been adopted as a framework for compu-
tational modelling and behavioural experiments. Both of these domains of empir-
ical research adhere to the concept of Iterated Learning: “[A] particular kind of 
cultural transmission” whereby “a behaviour arises in one individual through in-
duction on the basis of observations of behaviour in another individual who ac-
quired that behaviour in the same way” (Kirby et al. 2014: 108, emphasis in original). 
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Iterated Learning has informed a number of computational models of language 
evolution (e.g., Smith et al. 2003, Smith & Wonnacott 2010), and has extensively 
been used as the paradigm for lab experiments on the emergence of novel com-
munication (e.g., Kirby, Cornish & Smith 2008, Garrod et al. 2010, Tinits et al. 2017, 
among many others). Iterated Learning crucially depends on the concept of a 
transmission bottleneck: The number of possible utterances is larger than an agent 
can observe in their lifetime, which is why language adapts to the agents’ learning 
biases (see e.g., van Trijp 2011). Thus, “language is adapting in such a way as to 
ensure its own survival through the transmission process” (Kirby 2012: 595). Im-
portantly, it is not only the users of a language but also languages themselves that 
undergo adaptation (see also Deacon 1997, Christiansen & Chater 2008). 
 The Iterated Learning model is, in principle, not only applicable to language 
but also to other cultural artefacts, traditions or communicative codes such as 
writing systems (e.g., Garrod et al. 2010). However, most interestingly for our pre-
sent concerns, it operationalizes a certain general concept of language: Signals from 
a finite signal space are mapped to meanings from a finite meaning space (see, e.g., Kirby 
et al. 2008, Cornish 2010). While this is of course a deliberate simplification for 
modelling purposes, it bears many similarities with the widespread view of lan-
guages as inventories of form–meaning pairs. It can be traced back at least to Saus-
sure’s (1916) sign concept and has been adopted explicitly in Construction Gram-
mar and other usage-based perspectives, where constructions, that is pairings of 
form and meaning/function, are understood as the basic units of linguistic de-
scription. Of course, the notion of the centrality of the Saussurean sign and the 
evolution of its components is shared by a variety of approaches, including Bou-
chard (2013) and Hurford (1989, 2007, 2012), who himself mentions Construction 
Grammar as a suitable framework for investigating the evolution of language (see 
Hurford 2012: 348–362). 
 A major advantage of the CAS perspective on language is its generality: The 
evolution of language and of other cultural traits can be investigated in a shared 
theoretical framework. However, this generality also entails that its explanatory 
value is limited. This is why, for example, Larsen-Freeman (2017) characterises 
Complexity Theory as a ‘metatheory’ that warrants different object theories. 
Among the more widespread object theories are a number of usage-based ap-
proaches to language, some of which adopt a generalized theory of evolution, or 
adapt ideas from evolutionary biology (see, e.g., Croft 2000, 2011, Ritt 2004). One 
consequence is that many approaches within this framework do not take an ex-
plicit stance on the issue of unimodality vs. multimodality as signs can potentially 
be constituted through multiple modalities. The Iterated Learning framework 
programme might not explicitly label language as multimodal, but this approach 
agrees with multimodal approaches in stressing that other modalities than the 
vocal-auditory modality are subject to social-interactional, communicative, and 
learning pressures and played an important role in the evolution of language 
(Verhoef et al. 2014, Little et al. 2017, Motamedi et al. 2019). 
 Given the wide range of factors discussed in the emergence of language, 
language and its development are clearly not conceived of as domain-specific de-
velopments but as being part of a broader suite of cognitive and interactional pro-
cesses, although this distinction is generally becoming increasingly blurred in a 
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number of approaches (cf., e.g., Pleyer & Hartmann 2019). From a Complex Adap-
tive Systems perspective, language involves a multitude of different cognitive and 
physiological capabilities, including but not limited to embodied cognition (e.g., 
Bergen 2012), intention reading and pattern finding (e.g., Tomasello 2009), associ-
ative memory (e.g., Divjak 2019), and ‘massive storage’ (Hurford 2012: 261). There 
is therefore no agreement on components that are criterial for language, although 
social cognitive abilities often take centre stage. This idea is of course not unique 
to the CAS approach, but it is a stance that has arguably been taken more force-
fully in CAS approaches than in most other frameworks. 
 An important consequence of viewing language from a CAS perspective is 
that the boundary between cultural and biological factors gets blurred. As Pleyer 
& Hartmann (2019) have pointed out, this is in line with recent developments in 
biolinguistics that increasingly adopt an evo-devo perspective (e.g., Benítez-Bur-
raco & Boeckx 2014, Martins et al. 2016, Bowling 2017, see also Section 4.4.2). This 
is also one important aspect in which the conceptualisation of language as CAS 
has influenced, and continues to influence, research on language (evolution): Lan-
guage is investigated on a par with other phenomena that can be seen as results 
of cumulative evolution—for example, in the framework of cultural evolution the-
ory, which has become increasingly influential in recent years (see, e.g., Richerson 
& Boyd 2005, Mesoudi 2011). As a consequence, the challenge that language can-
not be easily delineated from other phenomena becomes part of a research pro-
gramme that aims at taking the continuous nature of the phenomena it investi-
gates into account. Even though most approaches that can be seen as belonging 
to the CAS framework aim at overcoming the strict divide between biology and 
culture, it seems fair to say that most of them view language, in the first place, as 
a cultural and communicative phenomenon. 
 Given that the feedback loop between individual actions and emergent phe-
nomena on a population level is part and parcel of the CAS model, its proponents 
see language both as an individual and as a supra-individual/social phenome-
non, even though different approaches may emphasise one of these two aspects 
more than the other. In this regard, it is also quite instructive to take a look at the 
brief history of Construction Grammar, which originally took “a synchronic and 
mentalist perspective” (Hilpert 2013: 1) by trying to describe the linguistic 
knowledge of individuals. However, Construction Grammar increasingly wid-
ened its scope to models of language variation and change, which makes a popu-
lation-level perspective necessary. As the emergence of structure is a dynamic, 
cultural process, there are in principle no categorical distinctions between lan-
guage and non-language. So, although CAS approaches assume continuity be-
tween language and other forms of communication, language is usually seen as 
species-specific in the sense that the different components that make up the ‘mo-
saic’ of language may also be found in other animals, but they are only fully in 
place in modern humans (Elman 1999).  
 CAS approaches more generally have arguably had a substantial impact on 
the research landscape in the field of language evolution and the CAS approach 
in general has been widely adopted (from Steels’ pioneering 2000 article, to Beck-
ner et al.’s widely-cited 2009 paper, to Kirby’s 2012 handbook article), probably 
partly due to its compatibility with a very broad spectrum of approaches: While 
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its foundational assumptions have been widely shared across various approaches 
in language evolution research for a long time, the CAS framework offers a con-
venient terminological toolkit for making these assumptions explicit, and it also 
invites researchers to broaden the scope of their research by putting the phenom-
ena they investigate into perspective, which, as we have seen, also has conse-
quences for the question of how a notion like language is conceptualized. 
 A second reason why CAS approaches are gaining popularity is not theo-
retical by nature, but empirical, as this framework can accommodate more easily 
than others increasing evidence of complex feedback effects among a variety of 
factors—physical, cognitive, behavioural, environmental—involved in language 
evolution, acquisition, and use. Among others, we can mention the constraints 
imposed on language form (sounds, morphology) by physical (temperature, hu-
midity) and cultural factors (population size, topology of social networks; Lupyan 
& Dale 2010); or the differential impact of language features on cognitive abilities 
(such as working memory in Amici et al. 2019). Ultimately, CAS approaches fit 
better than others with views of human evolution that see the emergence of mod-
ern cognition and culture as the result of a complex feedback loop between our 
biological endowment and our cultural practices, instead of as the outcome of a 
linear evolutionary process, with modern cognition appearing first and modern 
culture/behaviour happening later. In the case of language evolution, it is now 
viewed as the outcome of a feedback loop (seemingly ongoing) between our bio-
logical language-readiness, faculty of language, or linguisticality, and our lan-
guage-supported cultural practices. This ultimately entails that the boundaries 
between language evolution—understood as the processes that give rise to fully-
fledged human language—and diachronic language change become blurred as 
the biological processes that lead to the emergence (and further development) of 
language cannot be neatly separated from the cultural ones. Smith (2018) men-
tions two areas where the assumption of a close interaction between culture and 
biology seems plausible: On the one hand, he summarizes de Boer’s (2000) mod-
elling work on phonological niche construction in the evolution of vowel systems, 
in which a selection pressure for individuals with more fine-grained articulatory 
or perceptual capabilities interacts with cultural-evolutionary pressures that con-
tinuously push the vowel system to the limits of the available articulatory or per-
ceptual space. On the other hand, Smith (2018) argues that “process of gene–cul-
ture co-evolution might also act to constrain cultural evolution, by imposing bio-
logical constraints on the kinds of systems which can be learned”, which may be 
particularly relevant for the evolution of syntax. 
 A recent promising spin-off of CAS approaches is the self-domestication hy-
pothesis of language evolution, also adopted by Kirby (Thomas & Kirby 2018). In 
a nutshell, the existence in humans of features of domesticated mammals com-
pared to wild extant primates is claimed to account for both the emergence of a 
modern language-ready brain, mostly via a biological mechanism, and of modern 
languages, endowed with all the features that are familiar to linguists, mostly via 
a cultural mechanism. The cornerstone of the hypothesis is the reduced reactive 
aggression and the increased social tolerance brought about by self-domestica-
tion, which favoured language teaching and learning, and ultimately, the com-
plexification of linguistic forms. However, brain and cognitive changes are also 
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expected, either directly, as a consequence of domestication processes, or indi-
rectly, via a feedback effect triggered by the new social environment and the new 
language forms and uses (see Benítez-Burraco 2020, Benítez-Burraco & Progovac 
2020 for details). 
 In sum, the CAS approach thus provides a convenient metatheory that is 
compatible with a variety of different approaches to language and its evolution, 
including the view of language as a form of social interaction, which will be dis-
cussed in the next section. As it is applicable both to cultural and to biological 
systems, it is also very much in line with recent approaches that reject a categorical 
divide between culture and biology. 
 
4.3. Language as a Form of Social Interaction 
In explaining the emergence of human language, many scholars stress the social 
embedding of language, and its resultant importance for language evolution. The 
centrality of social cognition has a long history in the research on the evolution of 
language and mind (e.g., Byrne & Whiten 1988, Cheney & Seyfarth 2007, Dor et 
al. 2014, Dunbar 1993, Tomasello et al. 1993). Here, we single out two conceptions 
that have proved seminal within this perspective on language and its evolution, 
namely the shared intentionality framework by Michael Tomasello and col-
leagues (e.g., Tomasello et al. 2005; Tomasello 2008), and Stephen Levinson’s 
(2006) ‘human interaction engine’ hypothesis. Although Tomasello and Levinson 
do not expressly formulate a theory of language—the former concentrates on the 
prerequisites of language; the other, on the problem of human-specific interac-
tion—they definitely subscribe to the vision of language as a form of social cogni-
tion and social action, providing the empirical evidence and theoretical scaffold-
ing for this vision. 
 
4.3.1. Tomasello’s Shared Intentionality and Levinson’s Interaction Engine 
Tomasello’s shared intentionality framework (e.g., Tomasello et al. 2005) certainly 
ranks among the most important approaches in language evolution, even though 
one might wonder whether the framework actually seeks to explain the emer-
gence of language or rather the evolution of the cognitive prerequisites for lan-
guage. The answer to this question depends, again, on how exactly we define lan-
guage. It therefore makes sense to first take a look at Tomasello’s conceptualisation 
of language. While he does not provide a formal definition of language, he makes 
it clear that he sees language as a form of social action (Tomasello 2008: 342–345): 
“What is language if not a set of coordination devices for directing the attention 
of others?” (Tomasello et al. 2005: 690). On this view, language can be described 
as a way not only to coordinate attention, but also to construe objects and events 
from a particular perspective. But although language itself might aid in the cog-
nitive development of perspective-taking (e.g., Lohmann & Tomasello 2003), the 
cognitive and interactional machinery it is built on must have emerged prior to 
language. As Tomasello puts it: 
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If we want to understand human communication, [...] we cannot begin 
with language. Rather, we must begin with unconventionalized, un-
coded communication, and other forms of mental attunement, as foun-
dational.                (Tomasello 2008: 59) 
 
 Tomasello (2008) sees language as a human-specific form of coded commu-
nication that uses conventionalized (‘codified’) signs, in contrast to uncoded com-
munication making use of spontaneous, ad-hoc signs (cf. Arbib’s pantomime). But 
importantly, there is no clear dividing line between these two modes of commu-
nication, which is why they cannot be discussed in isolation. In this regard, To-
masello’s conception of language is similar to the ones espoused by the propo-
nents of the multimodal view. The main difference between them lies in that while 
Tomasello emphasises the social grounding of language, Kendon, McNeill, and 
Zlatev tend to focus on the cognitive-interactional dynamics of linguistic commu-
nication and assess language and its evolution from this vantage point.  
 Tomasello and his collaborators see the cognitive infrastructure supporting 
shared intentionality as being central to human cultural cognition. Shared inten-
tionality can be described as the motivation and ability to engage with others in 
collaborative activities with joint goals, plans and intentions and to share atten-
tion, experiences and other psychological states with others (cf. Tomasello et al. 
2005, Tomasello & Carpenter 2007, Tomasello 2008). The shared intentionality in-
frastructure is hypothesised to be the foundation of uniquely human sociality and 
cumulative culture. This ‘we-perspective’ (Tuomela 2007) is what enables humans 
to have not only an understanding of shared goals in the way that other animals 
do not but represents the foundation of distinctive human cultural artefacts. These 
include institutional realities such as money, as well as conventions and norms 
more generally. They are seen as crucial for the emergence and acquisition of lan-
guage, understood as a cultural artefact that is both conventional and subject to 
cumulative cultural evolution as evidenced in language change (Tomasello 1999, 
2008, 2019; cf. the view of language as a cumulative technology, Dor 2015). In this 
way, the shared intentionality infrastructure is seen as the sine qua non for the evo-
lution, acquisition, and use of language. Tomasello et al. (2005) acknowledge that 
language “must play a central role in all discussions of the evolution of human 
cognition.” However, as they stress, 
 
[…] saying that only humans have language is like saying that only 
humans build skyscrapers, when the fact is that only humans (among 
primates) build freestanding shelters at all. Language is not basic; it is 
derived.               (Tomasello et al. 2005: 690) 
 
Accordingly, language is seen as part and parcel of other human-specific social 
and cognitive skills and motivations that are already evident in the nonverbal 
communicative and cooperative behaviour of prelinguistic infants: the capacities 
that lead infants to communicate informatively and declaratively. 
 With regard to the evolutionary trajectory of language emergence, To-
masello agrees with proponents of multimodal approaches (see Section 4.1, but 
also Section 4.3.2 below) that gesture played a pivotal role in language evolution. 
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Specifically, he argues that the socio-cognitive infrastructure of shared intention-
ality was directly responsible for two original forms of human communication – 
pointing and pantomiming. Tomasello (2008) proposes declarative pointing, and 
especially informative-declarative pointing (i.e. pointing performed with the in-
tention of providing the recipient with new information) to be the first step dis-
tinguishing human ancestors from the generalized baseline of the last common 
ancestor (LCA) that humans shared with chimpanzees. Pantomiming, the other 
rudiment of the original human communication system, is understood as an 
iconic and action-based representation of an event (Tomasello 2008). In this re-
spect, Tomasello’s account ties in with those by Zlatev and Arbib (cf. Sections 4.1. 
and 4.4) but differs especially from the former in that Tomasello does not assume 
that pantomime must have been multimodal.  
 A similar idea, partly drawing on Tomasello’s account, can be found in Ste-
phen Levinson’s ‘interaction engine’ hypothesis (e.g., Levinson 2006), according 
to which what evolved in our ancestors was a socio-cognitive adaptation allowing 
“joint attention, common ground, collaboration and the reasoning about commu-
nicative intent” (Levinson & Holler 2014: 369). Levinson argues for a model of 
language evolution in which elements characteristic of modern language incre-
mentally grew upon each other. Levinson designates a package of these elements 
as the Human Interaction Engine (Levinson 2006). Its key properties include in-
tention-attribution, i.e. responses are to intentions, not to behaviours; cooperation, 
understood along the Gricean lines; turn-taking; predetermined sequential struc-
tures, such as adjacency pairs (cf. Pomerantz 1984); and multimodality, whereby  
 
[…] face-to-face interaction is characterized by multimodal signal 
streams—visual, auditory, and haptic at the receiving end, and kinesic, 
vocal, and motor at the producing end.         (Levinson 2006: 46) 
 
The Interaction Engine represents “a human interactional specialization”, which 
is universal across cultures, evolved prior to language and played a key role in its 
emergence (Levinson 2006: 42).  
 In contrast to the iterated learning framework and the research programme 
of Tomasello and colleagues, but in line with the multimodal approaches dis-
cussed in Section 4.1, Levinson explicitly stresses that human language is multi-
modal. For Levinson, language is one part of “human multi-modal communica-
tion” (Levinson & Holler 2014), which constitutes one integrated multimodal 
communication system, not in the sense of a special module or a ‘language organ’, 
but rather an assemblage of interrelated socio-cognitive abilities and communica-
tive behaviours (Levinson 2006: 54 and passim). The assorted nature of human 
communication is reflected in its evolutionary history—“human communication 
is evolutionarily stratified, composed of layers of abilities of different types and 
different antiquity” (Levinson & Holler 2014). The bottom layer is constituted by 
what he refers to as the ‘ethological elements’, such as mutual gaze or turn-taking, 
including vocal turn-taking, which can be found in many primate clades (Levin-
son & Holler 2014). Levinson argues that cooperation may have been boot-
strapped by these ethological elements in the context of novel ecological pressures 
(e.g., favouring bigger groups), which in turn laid the foundation for the 
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inferential background of human communication, exemplified by the presump-
tion of cooperation (Grice 1975) and the presumption of relevance (Sperber & Wil-
son 1986).  
 Levinson and Holler forcefully argue for the continuity of ape and human 
gesture (in contrast, e.g., to Kendon, see Section 4.1.). Levinson assumes that ape 
gesture formed the platform for the development of indexical gestures, and most 
importantly declarative pointing. Here, Levinson largely accepts Tomasello’s 
(2008) argument of how the evolution of prosociality in the hominin line, encap-
sulated by “joint attention, common ground, collaboration and the reasoning 
about communicative intent” (Levinson & Holler 2014), enabled the appearance 
of gestural indexes. In the next stage, iconic gesture emerged, accompanied by 
simple referential vocalisations, which gradually assumed the dominant role in 
the transfer of meaning (Levinson & Holler, 2014). 
 
4.3.2. Language as Social Interaction: Taking Stock 
Tomasello and Levinson see language through the lens of Theory of Mind and 
social intelligence. Similar to the perspective of complex adaptive systems (Sec-
tion 4.2. above), they conceive of language evolution as a multifactorial and emer-
gent process but emphasise the role of socio-cognitive preconditions installed in 
humans via biological evolution. Tomasello (2003) suggests that the emergence of 
joint attention and joint action paved the way for the emergence of symbols, while 
grammaticalization led to the development of complex grammar. He points out 
that “different aspects of language—for example, symbols and grammar—may 
have involved different processes at different evolutionary times.” (Tomasello 
2003: 109). Levinson stresses the canalization of language through multifactorial 
constraints, with some attractors being “cognitive, some functional (communica-
tional), some cultural-historical in nature” (Evans & Levinson 2009: 446). 
 Both Tomasello and Levinson see language as a layered ‘mosaic’ of different 
features, to use Hurford’s (2003) metaphor (cf. Boeckx 2012). On this view, lan-
guage (evolution) is neither strictly biological nor cultural, but instead character-
ized by an interplay of both evolutionary and cultural-historical processes (To-
masello et al. 2005, Tomasello 2008). They also converge on two other general 
points. First, language is first and foremost a communicative device—this tenet 
leads both Tomasello and Levinson to the appreciation of non-linguistic forms of 
communication, such as gesture, which forms a bridge between their positions 
and multimodal hypotheses (see Section 4.1). In particular, they both agree on the 
key role of iconic gesturing on the early, bootstrapping stages of language emer-
gence.  
 Second, communication is rooted in social action, which itself is ramified by 
general-purpose cognitive mechanisms. For instance, Tomasello insists that lan-
guage is not an object in any meaningful sense of that word, but rather one of the 
forms of social action. Tomasello does make a distinction between conventional, 
or ‘coded’, communication on the one hand and unconventionalised, uncoded 
communication on the other. However, he also reminds us that much of linguistic 
communication that makes use of conventionalised codes relies on uncoded as-
pects of meaning—as a case in point, consider pragmatic phenomena such as 
deixis and anaphora resolution (see Tomasello 2008: 57–59). Similarly, Levinson 
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resists the idea of language as abstracted from a rich interactional context consti-
tuted of social, cognitive and communicative factors.  
 
4.4. Language in the Language-Ready Brain 
As a fourth and final group of approaches to language evolution, we discuss those 
highlighting the neural implementation of the human ability to acquire and use 
language. We begin with Michael Arbib’s notion of the language-ready brain, which 
we see as a promising candidate for integrating many lines of interdisciplinary 
evidence characteristic of more recent language evolution research. As we will 
show, the concept of language-readiness has been adopted well beyond the spe-
cific framework suggested by Arbib. As an example, we mention one specific the-
ory of how the brain became language-ready, namely Offline Brain Systems pro-
posed by Bouchard (2013). We then move on to a research avenue that adopts this 
notion but complements this perspective with a relatively greater reliance on ge-
netic evidence. 
 
4.4.1. Michael Arbib: The Language-Ready Brain 
Michael Arbib’s account of language origins holds considerable significance for 
current research on language evolution, not by being any less controversial than 
its alternatives, but through its remarkable theoretical completeness and the wide 
range of interdisciplinary data on which it is based. It began as the Mirror System 
Hypothesis (MSH; Arbib 2005, 2012, 2016) and now continues as Cognitive Neu-
roprimatology (CNP; Arbib 2018). In his work, Arbib and his collaborators (see 
especially Arbib et al. 2018) rely on a broad range of interdisciplinary data, which 
particularly prominently includes comparative data from extant primates (unlike 
in many other language evolution accounts, not limited to great apes but extend-
ing to macaques and other monkey species) as well as results of research on hu-
man visual-bodily communication, including both co-speech gesture and sign 
languages. 
 In line with this breadth of the evidential basis of his account, Arbib has an 
encompassing view of language as an explanatory target in language evolution 
research, making it compatible with other approaches discussed here: for exam-
ple, it underscores the immanent multimodality of language (cf. Section 4.1.), the 
importance of both its formal-structural and social-interactional dimension (cf. 
Sections 4.1 and 4.3), as well as the division of labour between biological evolution 
in establishing the cognitive infrastructure for (proto-)language (see Sections 4.3 
and 4.4.2 below) and cultural evolution in accomplishing the subsequent transi-
tion from protolanguage to full human languages (cf. Sections 4.2 and 4.3). Still, 
like other approaches, Arbib’s MSH-CNP also has its specific focus, which in this 
case is on the cerebral implementation of language, as is evident in the name of 
the hypothesis as well as the title of his book-length manifesto, How the brain got 
language (Arbib 2012). Consistent with this focus is Arbib’s notion of the ‘lan-
guage-ready brain’. This term is particularly useful in organising the discussion, 
since it does not inherently prioritise biological or cultural-evolutionary processes 
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but manages to capture human uniqueness (since “only the human brain is lan-
guage ready”, Arbib 2012: ix). 
 MSH-CNP espouses an “Evo-Devo-Socio”-perspective on language evolu-
tion: 
 
What evolved (Evo) was a language-ready brain—not a brain with an 
innate mechanism encoding a universal grammar (Arbib 2007) but ra-
ther one enabling a child to acquire language (Devo), but only if raised 
in a milieu in which language is already present, something which, it 
is claimed, required tens of millennia of cultural evolution after the 
emergence of Homo sapiens (Socio).         (Arbib 2018: 7). 
 
 It highlights the building blocks that are not themselves (traditionally seen 
as) linguistic but are necessary for language, most importantly the cognitive in-
frastructure supporting the sharing of meaning: Parity and imitation. Parity is the 
ability to ‘translate’ between production and comprehension, whereby the same 
signal counts for more or less the same meaning to both the producer and the 
receiver of this signal (at least on a basic level, which neglects the complexities of 
pragmatic inference, e.g., Scott-Phillips 2015). Whereas a great majority of ac-
counts of language evolution simply take this fundamental requirement for com-
munication for granted, MSH-CNP offers a detailed account of the neuronal im-
plementation of parity, based on the mirror neuron system (e.g., Arbib 2005, 2012). 
While imitation is an important component of other language evolution accounts, 
including Tomasello (2008; see Section 4.3 above), Arbib (2012) stands out by de-
scribing a succession of steps in its development: from a mirror-neuron system for 
grasping and manual praxic actions, through simple imitation, then complex ac-
tion recognition and complex imitation (CAR&IM), ultimately leading to panto-
mime—initially of grasping and manual praxic actions, then of actions outside of 
own repertoire. 
 Pantomime is a characteristic feature of MSH-CNP. It is pantomime that is 
responsible for bringing about perhaps the most important qualitative break-
through, i.e. that of open-endedness in communication: “freedom to create novel 
associations” (2012: 261). Arbib (2012: 219) observes that pantomime has “the abil-
ity to create an open-ended set of complex messages exploiting the primates’ 
open-ended manual dexterity”. This potential to flexibly introduce novel signals 
for novel messages underwrites two other gains in expressive power otherwise 
typical of language, that is domain-generality and displacement. Pantomime is 
domain-general in that it can be used to communicate about many semantic do-
mains (rather than being restricted to, e.g., only predator evasion or food), and it 
can also express meanings displaced in time and space (not concerning the imme-
diate here and now). 
 As mentioned above, the scope of the evidential basis and the resulting 
breadth of the language-ready brain approach gives rise to numerous conver-
gences with the other approaches discussed in this paper. For example, Arbib ar-
gues that the neural mechanisms supporting language perception and production 
were first involved in non-communicative actions such as tool production, much 
in line with Kendon’s proposal (see Section 4.1 above). According to Arbib’s 
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hypothesis, the complex imitation of hand movements predates language learn-
ing and use and evolved as a form of social sharing of practical skills. One inter-
esting spin-off of Arbib’s hypothesis is the claim that language universals are 
mostly due to cultural factors, with language structure mostly evolving via a cul-
tural mechanism. This resonates with much work in the CAS paradigm (see Sec-
tion 4.2), and especially by Kirby and others, who come to similar conclusions 
from a different approach, i.e. computational simulations (e.g., Kirby et al. 2007) 
later complemented by laboratory experiments (e.g., Kirby et al. 2008). 
 The concept of language-readiness has also been adopted by other research-
ers who do not necessarily share Arbib’s MSH-CNP account. For instance, Bou-
chard (2013, 2015), who sees language as a system of signs, including combinato-
rial signs that underlie syntax (a view that shares many similarities with the Con-
struction Grammar view discussed above), argues that language-readiness is a 
consequence of the emergence of ‘offline brain systems’. These are systems that 
can be triggered not only by external but also by brain-internal events. These of-
fline brain systems enable a more abstract representational level, which allows for 
concepts and percepts (or rather: representations thereof) to be linked. He ex-
plains the emergence of these systems by an increase in synaptic interactions trig-
gered by a number of interacting developments, for example, the larger brain that 
entails an increased potential for synaptic interactions, the more globular shape 
of the brain that affords more cross-modular interactions, and alleles that improve 
synaptic repair, thus dramatically increasing synaptic interactions (see Bouchard 
2015). In addition, he also stresses the importance of bio-cultural coevolution: “the 
long dependency during infancy feeds more cultural material into these addi-
tional brain capacities” (Bouchard 2015). On this view, language, and even lan-
guage-readiness, can be seen as an exaptation, as a ‘side effect’, as it were, of other, 
more general biological (and cultural) developments. 
 This is only one example that shows that the concept of brain-readiness has 
become central not only to accounts of language evolution, but also for discussing 
the nature of language. But Arbib’s more specific proposal has remained highly 
influential as well and has been adopted and further developed in subsequent 
work. We will now discuss these developments in more detail. 
 
4.4.2. Antonio Benítez-Burraco and Cedric Boeckx: The Language-Ready Brain Revisited 
Most of Arbib’s neurobiological discussion is focused on brain areas related to 
language in humans and to visual and auditory perception in both humans and 
primates. At the same time, as far as language in prehistory is concerned, he 
mostly focuses on stone technologies in different extinct hominins. However, very 
recently a more detailed view has been emerging of how the hominin brain was 
genetically modified in the evolutionary history of our species to support pro-
cesses involved in language. In particular, a series of related papers by Benítez-
Burraco and Boeckx (Boeckx & Benítez-Burraco, 2014a, 2014b; Benítez-Burraco & 
Boeckx, 2015) has outlined a refined approach to Arbib’s view of the language-
ready brain, as well as Bouchard’s approach based on the notion that our more 
globular brain resulted in enhanced cross-modal thinking. These authors also 
adopt a multimodal approach, but mostly relate it to Poeppel’s claims of the 
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multifunctionality of the neural mechanisms involved in language processing (see 
Poeppel & Embick 2005; Poeppel 2012). Likewise, following Bouchard’s ‘neuro-
genetic factors’ (e.g., Bouchard 2013: Chap. 4), they are particularly interested in 
the genetic factors accounting for the changes resulting in our globularity. How-
ever, they build on recent paleoneurological and paleogenetic research about 
changes in the human genome and the human brain (and skull), principally after 
the split of Homo sapiens from the closely related clades of Neanderthals and Den-
isovans.  
 The most important reason for this new approach was avoiding what 
Benítez-Burraco and colleagues saw as an overreliance on speculation in the field 
of evolutionary linguistics, in particular relying on highly elusive and contentious 
proxies for language such as ‘symbolic behaviour’. Instead, they proposed to fo-
cus on the most distinctive and less controversial biological differences distin-
guishing modern humans from Neanderthals and other extinct hominins. Per-
haps the most prominent of such differences is the globular aspect of the human 
endocranial morphology (Bruner et al. 2003; Neubauer et al. 2010; Gunz et al. 2010, 
2012). In their papers, Benítez-Burraco and Boeckx argued that this globularisa-
tion of the human brain resulted in a rewiring that improved the connections be-
tween subcortical (particularly, the thalamus) and cortical structures, habilitating 
the neuronal workspace needed for transcending the signature limits of core 
knowledge systems and ultimately allowing to combine and unify conceptual 
units that belong to distinct core systems. They further argued that this ability can 
be equated with the core combinatorial operation in natural language (which may 
be called Merge by linguists of Chomskyan persuasion), which is at the core of 
our language-ready brain.  
 Overall, this is a bridging hypothesis linking considerations of syntax and 
neuroscience. One reason for this is that this freely combining merging ability is 
argued to be constrained via its interfacing with other cognitive systems and with 
the devices involved in speech/gesture production. In addition, compatible with 
the multimodal approaches to language (see Section 4.1.), this regulation is hy-
pothesised to result from basic neurobiological mechanisms, specifically, from the 
embedding of high frequency oscillations (e.g., gamma) inside oscillations oper-
ating at slower frequencies (e.g., alpha). This embedding ultimately enables the 
synchronization of distant cortical areas where the diverse core knowledge sys-
tems are located, with some subcortical structures, particularly the thalamus, act-
ing, as noted, as a relay centre or switching station connecting the cortical areas. 
The circuits bidirectionally connecting the thalamus and cortex are at the heart of 
the language-ready brain and share features of the networks responsible for 
mind-wandering and inner speech (Gruberger et al. 2011), as well as the top-down 
attentional regulation network (Miller & Buschman 2013). Likewise, some studies 
(e.g., Hecht et al. 2013) have related the changes resulting in our language-readi-
ness (particularly, the increase in the ratio between fronto-parietal vs fronto-tem-
poral connectivity from monkeys to apes to humans) to the evolutionary shift 
from emulation (i.e. a way of copying actions that focuses on the goal rather than 
the specific movements) to imitation (i.e. a way of copying actions that focuses on 
the specific movements rather than their ultimate goal).  
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 On Benítez-Burraco and Boeckx’s view, the emergence of a language-ready 
brain does not entail any drastic changes to the generalised primate brain, nor the 
evolution of entirely new neural devices. Rather, interareal cerebral communica-
tion via the synchronizing of spatially distributed oscillations is a generic strategy 
of the brain, specific neither to humans nor to language. Likewise, most if not all 
brain areas supporting language are most likely present in other species. Accord-
ingly, the evolution of the language-ready brain essentially involved a change in 
the dynamic connectivity of the brain resulting from a new anatomical context. 
Notably, Benítez-Burraco and Boeckx use the available information on ancient ge-
nomes to identify some of the genetic changes that may account for the observed 
differences between hominin species regarding globularisation and cognitive 
abilities. The candidate genes of interest include RUNX2 (a master transcription 
factor during vertebrate development) and several of its effectors; components of 
two gene networks implicated in vocal learning, clustered around the famous 
‘language gene’ FOXP2, and the ROBO and SLITs effectors; and finally, a set of 
genes clustered around AUTS2, strongly linked to autism (which, incidentally, 
reinforces the intriguing parallelisms between the autistic mind and the hypothe-
sised Neanderthal mind). Similarly to its neurobiological substrate, also the ge-
netic underpinnings of the language-ready brain are mostly shared with other 
primates, although some human-specific changes can be also identified, seem-
ingly accounting for the changes in neuronal networks described above. 
 
4.4.3. The Language-Ready Brain: Taking Stock 
On the language-ready brain view, the presence of compositional, open-ended 
and domain-general semantics is the most important criterial feature of language. 
This is thought to rely not on an enhanced, language-specific computational abil-
ity, but on an unbounded basic combinatorial ability capable of transcending the 
limits of core conceptual systems. Other components of language, particularly, 
some forms of phonology and pragmatics, are assumed to predate this human-
specific innovation. Accordingly, speech or interaction through (proto)language 
with communicative or socializing purposes are thought to have been present in 
other hominin species, particularly Neanderthals. Overall, this is a genuinely non-
modular construal of language. Neural devices involved in language processing 
are hypothesised to perform basic computations that are recruited for language, 
but also for other cognitive processes. Accordingly, the impairment of any of these 
neural components of language—either developmentally, resulting from gene 
mutations, or in the mature state, resulting from brain damage—is expected to 
give rise to mixed symptoms and diverse pathological, comorbid conditions. As 
a consequence, too, language is construed as domain-specific only at the term of 
growth, with the ‘language module’ resulting from the interaction of diverse on-
togenetic and functional brain modules through development.  
 This view is in line with neuroconstructivist approaches to human cognition 
(cf. Karmiloff-Smith 2009), where language is understood primarily as a biological 
capacity, resulting from human-specific gene mutations affecting genes involved 
in brain development and wiring and language evolution, as the result of minor 
changes in brain wiring—although it also acknowledges a significant evolution-
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ary continuity of language with the communication and cognition of other ani-
mals, in particular of non-human apes. This also results in a relative focus on the 
individual implementation of language, with cognitive changes resulting from 
neuroanatomical changes, themselves principally resulting from genetic muta-
tions. Ultimately, supraindividual and cultural aspects of language are subordi-
nated to individual and biological aspects, although some feedback effect of cul-
ture on cognition is expected, but not with a decisive triggering effect on language 
evolution. One interesting and distinctive consequence is a conception of lan-
guage primarily as a tool for thinking (rather than for communicating), since our 
language-readiness would have initially emerged as a new, improved mechanism 
of conceptualising. Regarding the question of whether language is species-spe-
cific, this is mostly seen as an empirical question in these approaches, with the 
expectation of relatively few uniquely human components ‘on top of’ a majority 
of components shared with other species. Accordingly, this is more a gradable 
and gradual view of language (evolution) than a categorical one. 
 
5. Discussion 
In this paper we have argued against the intuitively appealing and occasionally 
expressly formulated (especially Botha 2000) dictum that language evolution as a 
field of research needs an overtly formulated, analytical, top-down definition of 
language. We have proposed that such a definition is most likely impossible, and 
further, even if possible, it might not be conducive to any tangible gains. As a 
particularly forceful illustration of this latter point, we discussed the term FLN, 
which was conceived in response to the perceived problem of a lack of a technical 
definition of (the faculty of) language, but which—as we have documented—was 
defined in two mutually exclusive ways, whose combining results in a tautology. 
In the subsequent literature the two mutually exclusive definitions widely func-
tion interchangeably, without scholars as much as noticing the conflict – a striking 
demonstration that the bulk of research practice in the field depends on other fac-
tors (arguably including an author’s larger theoretical orientation) but not on the 
exact letter of the proposed top-down definitions.7 
 Notably, the claim we advance here does not imply denying the importance 
of clear definitions in scientific discourse generally, and in language evolution re-
search specifically. This is no contradiction: We distinguish between definitions 
on two different and clearly separable levels. One is the level of more specific 
 
7  Worth mentioning here is that while FLN/FLB distinction aims at a precise delineation of (the 
biological underpinnings of) language, other frameworks such as those that can be grouped 
under the umbrella of “Complex Adaptive Systems” approaches more or less explicitly 
acknowledge that language cannot be clearly delineated from other phenomena. In a way, 
these two views of language can be considered two extreme poles on the continuum from an 
extremely broad to a maximally narrow conceptualization. The different definitions along this 
continuum show that the way we think about language as an object of study partly depends 
on theoretical presuppositions and partly on the epistemological interest of each approach: 
While Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch, for example, aim at carving out the biological, species-
specific prerequisites for language and therefore narrow down the scope of language as a 
technical term considerably, proponents of CAS accounts take a macro-perspective on biolog-
ical and cultural evolution and view language in the broader context of social-interactional 
phenomena. 
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technical terms that function as building blocks of theories and especially of hy-
potheses, which require unambiguous formulations so as to meet the fundamen-
tal standards of non-triviality and falsifiability. This level is thus essential for sci-
ence to make progress by conclusively resolving arguments with recourse to em-
pirical data rather than getting stuck on conceptual differences.8 The other level, 
however, is the global level of macroscopic notions, which cannot (without fur-
ther specification) function as building blocks of specific theories or hypotheses 
but have a different role, related instead to integrative and classificatory goals. 
 So, for example, we largely concur with Behme that 
 
[w]hile it may be neither feasible nor beneficial that all language evo-
lution researchers adopt the same definition of ‘language’ it would be 
desirable for them to explicitly state which definition they adopt; 
(2016: 8) 
 
and with Fitch (2010: 24) that “unspecified use of […] the word ‘language’ […] is 
probably best avoided”. A small but essential caveat is that any theory-specific 
use of language will inevitably remain meronymous, in the sense of always relat-
ing only to part of the complex phenomenon. Therefore, in our view it is more 
productive to push definitions one level down: Leave language as an unanalysable 
prime and provide rigorous definitions of particular components or aspects of lan-
guage as they function in specific theories under consideration. One very im-
portant advantage is that such a strategy prevents attempts to monopolise the 
word language by a particular theory that would claim unique privileged access 
to a ‘correct’ understanding of language, something that Chomskyan approaches 
have been criticised for. 
 Exactly such was the nature of the FLN/FLB distinction (again, two differ-
ent distinctions, as we show in Section 3), categorical about the nature of language 
and expressly formulated to guide language evolution research as an understand-
ing of the language faculty privileged over other theories. Interestingly, however, 
much fuzzier notions of language seem to have better served the actual language 
evolution research. Due to the breadth of research interests in language evolution 
in the last decade, and the intense interdisciplinarity that cuts across many dis-
parate areas of investigation—from computational modelling, to primate commu-
nication, to sign linguistics—language evolution thrives on fuzzy definitions of 
language and finds categorical, top-down approaches too constraining. This idea 
is reflected in Section 4, which surveys influential lines of research in language 
evolution, mostly focusing on the most recent trends. In recent years, the bulk of 
research in this field revolves around the problems of multimodality, the dynam-
ics of cultural transmission, language as a form of social interaction or biological 
language-readiness. What emerges from this survey is indeed a breadth of the 
range of these perspectives that precludes their fitting together under any single 
definition of language. 
 
8  We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for comments that led us to stress this important 
point. 
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 This is far from surprising if we look to analogies in other notions in science 
that, like language, are macroscopic, unobservable and unoperationalisable. One 
example comes from biologists, who tend to avoid top-down approaches to life 
(and aprioristic definitions of life) and focus instead on the study of the building 
blocks of living beings, regardless of whether they can be found in other domains 
(e.g., water) or not (the DNA). Only a successful characterization of these building 
blocks can lead to achieving a comprehensive view of the nature of life (as in sys-
tems biology) and its evolution (as in, e.g., evolutionary developmental biology). 
Similarly, analyses of the use of terms such as heat in physics (Lewis & Linn 1996) 
or gesture in primatology (Bourjade et al. 2020) provide arguments for a beneficial 
and productive role of conceptual diversity, at least when certain conditions are 
met such as consistent use of a term within a particular approach. 
 One particularly interesting motivation for why a lack of a single top-down 
definition of language in language evolution is not as consequential now as it was 
20 years ago may be a methodological change in the profile of this field, from 
theoretical to empirical research (see especially Dediu & de Boer 2016, Fitch 2017, 
Żywiczyński 2018, Nölle et al. 2020). In 2017, Wacewicz & Żywiczyński wrote: 
 
Language evolution researchers no longer stop at being consumers of 
empirical data, but rather aim at being providers as well, acquiring 
data by experimentation, observation, or simulation (and a steadily in-
creasing proportion of these results then feed back into more general 
discussions on the nature of language […]). The maturation of lan-
guage evolution research has been marked by a steady growth in the 
proportion of empirical (“new data”) research relative to theoretical 
(synthetic) argumentation […]. In the volume that grew out of the first 
EVOLANG conference in 1996 (Hurford et al. 1998), all 24 contribu-
tions have a decidedly theoretical (synthesising) character, whereas 
the proceedings of the most recent conference (Roberts et al. 2016) are 
dominated by empirical research: 123 contributions, as opposed to 25 
theoretical.              Wacewicz & Żywiczyński (2017: 3) 
 
 What follows is that recently, very few publications present comprehensive 
scenarios of language evolution, and conversely, a vast proportion of studies are 
more fine-grained, addressing much more specific and narrower Kuhnian “puz-
zles” such as the efficiency of gestural vs multimodal signals in conveying emo-
tional meanings (Zlatev et al. 2017) or the effect of processed food on the dental 
configuration and in turn on the production of fricatives (Blasi et al. 2019). A nat-
ural consequence is that such specific and bottom-up studies do not directly aim 
at explaining language evolution sensu largo, and so do not need to work with a 
definition of language sensu largo.  
 An epitome of both the empirical and bottom-up approach is the Causal 
Hypotheses In Evolutionary Linguistics Database (CHIELD, pronounced ‘shield’; 
Roberts et al. 2020). CHIELD contains crowd-sourced entries for over 400 publi-
cations, with over 3,400 causal links between more than 1,700 variables and aims 
not only at cataloguing hypotheses about language evolution but also making 
data on them interoperable. As it is unlikely that all 32 authors (much less all 41 
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contributors to the database) would converge on a single explicit definition of lan-
guage, CHIELD is possible not despite but because it deliberately avoids defining 
language (cf. “A classic example of this is the word ‘language’ itself, which can be 
interpreted as anything relating to human communication or only a specific syn-
tactic ability”; Roberts et al. 2020: 3). 
 Consequently, one way of describing language evolution could be to 
‘bracket’ the notion of language and rely solely on content-independent, institu-
tional and scientometric criteria such as conferences, journals, laboratories and 
citation patterns (cf. Bergmann & Dale 2016). This would delineate a collection of 
bottom-up approaches and researchers that jointly form a ‘community of practice’ 
or a denkkolektiv (Fleck 1979). This is an interesting approach with some genuine 
explanatory power; for example, this strategy would address Haspelmath’s (2016) 
question of why Journal of Language Evolution publishes research on language 
change of apparently non-evolutionary character.  
 Nevertheless, such an approach would seem deeply unsatisfying to the re-
searchers in the field of language evolution, who have a strong sense of unifying 
research substance, and in particular the unifying aim of explaining the origin of 
language. This substance is primary to the content-independent factors, in that it 
provides identity to the field and gives rise to—as opposed to being secondary 
and merely resultant from—the patterns and networks of personal and institu-
tional connections. It is the basic, common, intuitive understanding of language, 
and basic human curiosity about how it began, that sets the explanatory goal for 
the field of language evolution as a whole, and thus shapes its research practices 
and the resulting denkkollektiv—rather than vice versa. 
 This is the other point that follows from our review: although the recently 
most influential approaches to language evolution are indeed too diverse to be 
brought together under a common definition of language, they also do overlap to 
a large extent in terms of key definitional dimensions. As discussed in section 4, 
these dimensions are in particular the criterial components of language, its mo-
dalities, domain-specificity, biological versus cultural profile, (supra)individual 
character, gradability, species-specificity and primary function. This complex pat-
tern of numerous similarities and sporadic but significant differences is character-
istic of a family-resemblance category (Wittgenstein 1953). Most importantly from 
the point of view of research practice, this family resemblance pattern under-
writes fruitful communication between these approaches, leading to cross-fertili-
sation and opening new research vistas: for example, there is a growing number 
of studies in the Iterated Learning paradigm that look at different communicative 
modalities (e.g., Motamedi et al. 2019); as another example, the self-domestication 
theory, proposed within the Complex Adaptive Systems camp, is now most ac-
tively developed by the proponents of the language ready brain (see especially 
Benítez-Burraco & Progovac 2020). Thus, based on a tacit and fundamentally in-
effable notion of language, all these approaches jointly contribute to the develop-
ment of the field of language evolution.  
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